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Distributive justice concerns how individuals and societies distribute income in a just or
equal manner. We aimed to test the roles of social preference in behavioral distributive
justice. We thus provide evidence of a causal link between the neural and behavioral
results through the application of bilateral transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS)
over the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) of our participants. The participants were found
to make fairer distributions within the known position after receiving right anodal/left
cathodal tDCS and receiving right cathodal/left anodal tDCS over the TPJ than
the participants who received the sham stimulation. Simultaneously, we elicited the
participants’ advantage inequity aversion and found that the participants who received
right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and who received right cathodal/left anodal tDCS
over the TPJ were more averse to advantage inequity. Additionally, the participants’
distributive proportions to the lowest income stratum within the known position were
strongly related to their social preference of advantage inequity aversion. Therefore, the
present study demonstrated that the modulation of the excitability of the TPJ using tDCS
altered the distributive decisions of the participants within the known position, and this
effect might be attributable to a change in the individuals’ social preferences.
Keywords: distributive decision, social preference, advantage inequity aversion, temporoparietal junction,
transcranial direct current stimulation
INTRODUCTION
The issues surrounding economic fairness and distributive justice arise in the context of allocation
problems and focus on the normative question of how the allocation should be performed.
Formally, distributive justice is concerned with “what rules, procedures, or mechanisms a society
or group should use to allocate its scarce resources, commodities, and necessary burdens among
individuals with competing needs and claims.” There are many empirical studies of issues that
concern how a society or group allocates benefits or burdens in a just or moral manner through the
use of three different approaches.
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The veil of ignorance approach describes a decision making
environment in which hypothetical rational individuals make
decisions from an “original position” prior to entering society,
without any knowledge of what their position in society might
be or what individual attributes or circumstances they will face
(Vickrey, 1945; Harsanyi, 1955; Rawls, 1971). Therefore, choices
made in the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance”
are made in a state of uncertainty. The goal of using the “veil”
of imperfect information is to strip away any prejudices from
history, status quo property rights, and institutions so that
impartial decisions based on the formal principle of distributive
justice can be made.
The social-planner approach assumes that some outside
judge or observer, a social planner, or some impersonal social
welfare function, evaluates the equity of income distribution.
The approach lacks any personal involvement because the social-
planner does not become a member of the society (Brandt
and Boulding, 1962; Cowell and Kuga, 1981; Lambert, 2001;
Traub et al., 2005, 2009). This procedure required him or her
to genuinely behave as an umpire for income distribution. The
social-planner compiled their orderings of income sets without
having any stakes in the outcomes. The umpire himself or herself
was excluded from any chance of receiving a payoff.
The known position approach sets an authority, leader, or
member of the highest income stratum to make decisions for
income distribution. They know their prominent roles in this
society before they make decisions. They had to determine both
their own payoffs and the payoffs of their society members.
He or she was called to the forefront and became visible to
all other members to strengthen his or her social responsibility
in the face of the whole public (Sutter and Weck-Hannemann,
2003; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Traub et al., 2009). This
approach establishes that a person’s social preference in terms of
maximizing a social welfare function of the payoff distribution is
mixed with his or her selfish motive in terms of maximizing his
or her own payoff.
In the veil of ignorance approach, income distributions share a
striking similarity with lotteries (Friedman, 1953; Dahlby, 1987).
However, for the evaluation of income distribution, it is often
argued that individuals develop social preference and would thus,
in contrast to lotteries, exhibit both a risk component and an
altruism component in their behavior (Cowell and Schokkaert,
2001). The social-planner approach assumes that the planner
maximizes the social welfare of an external society, and the lack
of personal involvement within this context appears to induce
a moderate degree of inequality aversion (Traub et al., 2005).
Under the known position approach, the authority’s preferences
determined the choice of the prevailing income distribution. The
utility of a person is assumed to depend not only on his or her
own monetary payoff but also on a specific social welfare function
of the payoff distribution. Hence, results that were obtained
on the known position approach support recent experimental
evidence on social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and
Rabin, 2002).
Most of the above studies used non-incentivized
questionnaires that ask participants to choose between lotteries
representing different income distributions from the perspective
of an uninvolved outside observer, i.e., from behind the veil of
ignorance and a purely individual risk perspective (Bernasconi,
2002; Amiel et al., 2009). In this study, we elicit preferences
over income distribution in an incentive compatible manner
and test how such preferences relate to some simple notions
of income justice. We focused on “fixed pie” type problems in
which the initial endowment of items is to be distributed into
three different social stratums, and the participants are required
to have a size order for the distributive income across different
stratums.
To test the role of social preference in behavioral distributive
justice, we utilized a controlled laboratory setting with three
different distributive contexts, which included a veil of ignorance,
a social-planner and a known position. In the first distributive
context, the participants do not know which future position in
society they (as well as other individuals) will be assigned when
deciding how to distribute the initial endowment across the
different stratums. In the second distributive context, participants
will not be assigned a future position in society and will receive a
fixed payoff as a social-planner when deciding how to distribute
the initial endowment across the different stratums. In the third
distributive context, the participants know that they will be
assigned to the richest stratum in society when they decide how
to distribute the initial endowment across the different stratums.
In addition, we added a choice menu to measure participants’
advantage inequity aversion in the experiment.
Despite the long history of work on distributive behavior,
its psychological and neural underpinnings remain poorly
understood, and much of the work has centered on the intentions
of decisions. The previous studies include many debates on
whether and how the “weights” that are assigned to the individual
payoffs (self-interest or risk aversion) and the payoff distributions
of the others (social preference or inequity aversion) in the
participants’ objective functions.
Essentially, there are obvious distinctions between the two
different distributive intentions in neural substrates. Previous
clinical and neuroimaging studies have revealed the involvement
of a distributed bihemispheric, corticosubcortical network in
decision making (Ernst and Paulus, 2005; Krain et al., 2006).
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is an important part
of this network (Manes et al., 2002; Clark et al., 2003) and
appears to be particularly involved in decision making when
choices are ambiguous (Krain et al., 2006). This connection is
of particular relevance in light of the growing evidence that this
region is involved in risky decisions (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Preuschoff et al., 2006; Cazzell et al., 2012; Holper et al., 2014).
In contrast, a wide variety of neuroimaging studies can provide
positive evidence to support the hypothesis that altruism derives,
at least in part, from the tendency to consider others’ states, and
experiments with adults indicate that subjects with better skills in
reading others’ states show more altruistic behavior (Underwood
and Moore, 1982). One brain region that has been repeatedly
and reliably found to be implicated in tasks that require the
ability to represent and understand others’ perspectives is the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Ruby and Decety, 2001; Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Frith and Frith,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 224
fpsyg-08-00224 February 17, 2017 Time: 18:4 # 3
Luo et al. tDCS over TPJ Alters Distributive Decisions
2007; Young and Dodell, 2010). If altruistic behavior is indeed
supported by an appreciation of others’ perspectives, then the TPJ
should play an important role in decisions to act altruistically.
Neuroimaging studies are useful for establishing correlations
between brain activations and processes of considering others’
perspectives (social preference), but they do not provide
information regarding whether a given region is necessary to the
resulting behavior. Non-invasive brain stimulation techniques,
such as repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS),
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), allow for the study
of the behavioral consequences of an externally induced brain
activation or inactivation in healthy participants and thus enable
the establishment of a causal relationship between the TPJ and
social preference (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau et al., 2007a,b; Ye
et al., 2015a).
The main objective of the present paper was to provide neural
evidence for intrinsic preference in different contexts of income
distribution and to test whether distributive decisions in different
contexts are driven by social preference. We performed an
income distribution experiment to investigate whether bilateral
stimulation of the TPJ (anodal stimulation of the right and
cathodal stimulation of the left TPJ or vice versa) would alter
distributive decisions in different contexts. By comparing the
values of advantage inequity aversion in the choice menu across
different tDCS stimulations, a causal relationship between the
excitability of the TPJ and social preference might be observed.
Based on these results, we can infer that the modulation of the
activity of the TPJ might alter the distributive decisions that
are made within the known position through their main driving
force, i.e., individual advantage inequity aversion.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
We recruited 78 healthy college students (39 females; mean
age 19.3 years, ranging from 17 to 25 years) to participate in
our experiment. All participants were right-handed and naïve
to tDCS and distributive tasks, with no history of psychiatric
illness or neurological disorders. The participants were randomly
assigned to receive right anodal/left cathodal tDCS (n = 26, 13
females), left anodal/right cathodal tDCS (n = 26, 13 females)
or sham stimulation (n = 26, 13 females). The final payoff
was a fixed show-up fee of 20 RMB Yuan (approximately 3
US dollars) plus the reward gained from the distributive tasks.
The participants received 52.5 RMB Yuan (approximately 7.9 US
dollars) on average, fluctuating according to their performance.
Participants gave informed written consent before entering the
study, which was approved by the Zhejiang University ethics
committee. No participants reported any adverse side effects
concerning pain on the scalp or headaches after the experiment.
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation
Transcranial direct current stimulation applied a weak direct
current to the scalp via two saline-soaked surface sponge
electrodes (35 cm2). The current was constant and delivered by a
battery-driven stimulator (Starlab, Spain), which was controlled
through a Bluetooth signal. It was adjusted to induce cortical
excitability of the target area without any physiological damage to
the participants. Various orientations of the current had various
effects on the cortical excitability. Generally speaking, anodal
stimulation enhances cortical excitability, whereas cathodal
stimulation restrains it (Nitsche and Paulus, 2000).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
treatments. For right anodal/left cathodal stimulation, the anodal
electrode was placed over the right CP6 according to the
international EEG 10–20 system, while the cathodal electrode
was placed over the left CP5. For left anodal/right cathodal
stimulation the placement was reversed. The anodal electrode was
placed over CP5 and the cathodal electrode was placed over CP6
(Figures 1A–C). For sham stimulation, the procedures were the
same but the current lasted only for the first 30 s. The participants
may have felt the initial itching, but there was actually no current
for the rest of the stimulation. This method of sham stimulation
has been shown to be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006). The current
was constant and of 2 mA intensity with 15 s of ramp up and
down, the safety and efficiency of which was shown in previous
studies (Jacobson et al., 2012).
Before the decision making tasks, the laboratory assistant put
a tDCS device on the participant’s head for stimulation. After
20 min of stimulation, the tDCS device was taken off and the
participant was then asked to complete distributive decision
task and a choice menu. It has been demonstrated that bilateral
tDCS over cortical brain regions facilitates greater improvements
for healthy subjects’ compared to uni-lateral stimulation (Vines
et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2010; Sehm et al., 2013). That is the
reason we chose a bifrontal electrode montage was to provide
stimulation able to enhance the activity of one side of the TPJ
while simultaneously diminishing the other side (see Sellaro et al.,
2016 for further discussing of the bilateral stimulation).
Task and Procedure
After the participants received tDCS stimulation for 20 min
(bilateral stimulation, single-blinded, sham-controlled), they
completed an income distributive task (the computer program
for this task was written in visual C#).
The task consists of 30 stories, and each story includes a
distributive context and a question about how to distribute
an initial endowment among three stratums (Figure 2). These
stories involve three types of distributive context (social-planner,
the veil of ignorance and known position) with 10 levels of initial
endowments (30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 210, 240, 270, 300 chips),
and 50 chips= 1 RMB Yuan. The participants could choose freely
which amounts to give each of the three stratums in this task.
To avoid the order effect and income effect, we assigned three
fixed orders (pseudo-random order) in which all stories were
presented on the screen, and we balanced the numbers of people,
participants’ gender, and stimulation group across the three
orders. The presentation order of the three different distributive
contexts was also counter-balanced in the three orders among
the participants receiving the three different stimulations. The
trails were shown in fixed sequence to insure that the behaviors of
the participants receiving different stimulations were completely
comparable. However, within each pseudo-random order, the
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic drawing of electrode positions suited for tDCS of the temporoparietal junction of the human brain. (A) Stimulation of the
respective cortices according to the 10–20 system. (B) The electrode placement of left anodal/right cathodal stimulation. The anodal electrode was placed over CP5
and the cathodal electrode was placed over CP6. (C) The electrode placement of left cathodal/right anodal stimulation. The anodal electrode was placed over CP6
and the cathodal electrode was placed over CP5. The axis represents the range of input voltage from −18.476v to 14.463v.
sequence of the contexts and the chips were counter-balanced
with no obvious rules which may influence the expectations
or behaviors of the participants (see Supplementary Material).
These stories were presented one by one, and participants made
distributive decisions by computers (Figure 3).
The participants were given 30 min to complete the task
of income distribution. After the participants completed the
distributive task, they were asked to complete a choice menu in
10 min and a questionnaire before finally receiving their payment.
We used the choice menu aims to provide a simple and
direct measure of participants’ social preference of advantageous
inequity aversion. The menu modified from Yang et al. (2016),
consists of 10 decisions (cf. Table 1). In each, the decision
maker (denoted by ‘proposer’) is asked to choose between
two options (A and B). Each option allocates money to the
proposer and to an anonymous other participant (denoted
by ‘receiver’). For all options the payoff of the proposer is
higher than for the receiver. This means that all cases yield
advantageous inequality for the proposer, and it allows us to
use this menu to measure participants’ advantageous inequity
aversion parameter β (see Supplementary Material for detail).
Each participant decides as if she is a proposer, because
FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the experimental design. After
20 min of stimulation, each participant was then asked to complete the
distribution task in the three types of distributive context and the choice menu.
roles are not (randomly) determined until the end of the
experiment.
The payoffs for Option B remain constant across all 10
decisions, with the proposer earning 340, which is 240 more
than the receiver (100). For the first decision, Option A gives
the proposer more (370) and yields lower inequality (190) than
B. Any non-negative β then implies higher utility for A than for
B. Moving down along the table, the own earnings in Option
A decrease, as does the inequality. This increases the level of
advantageous inequity aversion needed to prefer Option A to B.
The last column in the table gives these threshold values for β.
Data Analysis
We first focused on comparing the distributive decisions of
the participants across the different distributive contexts in the
sham group, and we hoped for the result that the participants’
distributive decisions depended on the distributive context.
To test the causal relationship between the activity of TPJ
and participants’ distributive decisions, we investigated the
distributive decisions across the three contexts in the different
stimulation group. We further measured the participants’ social
preferences of advantage inequity aversion in the different
stimulation group and analyzed the correlation between the
participants’ social preferences and their distributive decisions to
the stratum of the lowest income to demonstrate the role of the
participants’ social preferences in distributive decisions within
the three distributive contexts.
Additionally, we used the participants’ distributive incomes to
the three stratums and the Gini coefficient (a method measuring
distributive fairness in economics) as data to represent the
participants’ distributive decisions. The higher the value of Gene
coefficient is, the more unfair our society is.
The Gini coefficient is usually defined mathematically based
on the Lorenz curve, which plots the proportion of the total
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FIGURE 3 | A story within the context of social-planner, veil of ignorance and known position presenting on the computer screen.
income of the population (y axis) that is cumulatively earned
by the bottom x% of the population. An alternative approach
would be to consider the Gini coefficient as half of the relative
mean absolute difference, which is a mathematical equivalence
(Sen, 1984). The mean absolute difference is the average absolute
difference of all pairs of items of the population, and the relative
mean absolute difference is the mean absolute difference divided
by the average, to normalize for scale. If xi is the wealth or income
of person i, and there are n persons, then the Gini coefficient G is
given by:
G =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |xi − xj|
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 xj
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS statistical software
(version 20).
RESULTS
In the sham group, there was no significant difference in
participants’ distributive incomes to stratum A (the highest
income stratum) between the social-planner and veil of ignorance
contexts (Mann–Whitney test: z = 0.478, p = 0.6326). However,
the participants’ distributive incomes to stratum A in the context
of social-planner and veil of ignorance contexts were both lower
than that in the context of known position (Mann–Whitney test:
z =−8.772, p< 0.01; z =−8.930, p< 0.01).
In the sham group, there was no significant difference
in participants’ distributive incomes to stratum B (the midst
income stratum) between the social-planner and veil of ignorance
contexts (Mann–Whitney test: z = −0.102, p = 0.9187).
However, the participants’ distributive incomes to stratum B
in the social-planner and veil of ignorance contexts were
both higher than that in the context of known position
(Mann–Whitney test: z= 12.384, p< 0.01; z= 12.475, p< 0.01).
In the sham group, there was no significant difference in
participants’ distributive incomes to stratum C (the lowest
income stratum) between the social-planner and veil of ignorance
contexts (Mann–Whitney test: z = −0.286, p = 0.7747).
TABLE 1 | The choice menu of advantage inequity aversion.
Nr. Option A Option B Choose B iff:
1 Yours: 370; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ −0.60
2 Yours: 350; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ −0.14
3 Yours: 330; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.11
4 Yours: 310; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.27
5 Yours: 290; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.38
6 Yours: 270; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.47
7 Yours: 250; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.53
8 Yours: 230; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.58
9 Yours: 210; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.62
10 Yours: 190; Other’s: 180 Yours: 340; Other’s: 100 β ≤ 0.65
The table presents the 10 decisions (given in rows) between options A and B.
“Yours” refers to the proposer’s payoff and “Other’s” to the receiver’s payoff. The
final column includes the values of β for which the inequity aversion model (1)
rationalizes a choice of option A. Of course, this column was not shown to subjects.
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TABLE 2 | The mean and SD of distributive amounts across contexts and chips in the sham group.
Chips Contexts The veil of ignorance The social-planner The known position
Stratums A B C A B C A B C
30 Mean 12 10 8 12.8 10 7.2 22 4.8 3.2
SD 4.08 0 4.08 4.58 0 4.58 9.13 5.10 4.76
60 Mean 26.8 19.2 14 24.4 20 15.6 45.2 9.2 5.6
SD 7.48 2.77 6.45 5.07 0 5.07 14.47 8.62 7.12
90 Mean 36.4 29.6 24 36 29.6 24.4 56.4 19.2 14.4
SD 7.57 2 7.07 9.13 2 8.21 20.99 11.87 10.03
120 Mean 51.2 39.6 29.2 48.4 39.2 32.4 84.4 21.6 14
SD 9.71 2 8.62 11.79 4.93 9.26 28.59 17 12.91
150 Mean 60 48.8 41.2 60 50.4 39.6 110.4 22.4 17.2
SD 12.25 3.32 10.13 11.18 4.55 11.36 38.24 21.27 17.68
180 Mean 71.2 58.4 50.4 69.2 59.6 51.2 131.2 27.2 21.6
SD 13.64 3.74 10.98 13.52 2 12.36 47.20 25.90 21.92
210 Mean 82.4 68 59.6 81.2 68 60.8 147.2 36 26.8
SD 17.39 5 13.38 15.09 5 11.15 49.88 28.43 22.68
240 Mean 97.6 80.4 62 92.8 79.2 68 170 40 30
SD 15.08 4.55 15.55 18.82 6.40 15 58.24 32.91 26.46
270 Mean 106 88.4 75.6 107.2 88 74.8 198.8 40 31.2
SD 16.33 5.54 14.17 26.85 8.66 21.63 70.79 39.48 32.32
300 Mean 117.2 98.4 84.4 115.6 99.6 84.8 221.2 43.6 35.2
SD 21.51 4.73 18.73 23.47 4.55 20.64 78.97 43.67 36.41
Total Mean 66.08 54.08 44.84 64.76 54.36 45.88 118.7 26.4 19.92
SD 35.12 29.90 25.94 34.81 29.84 26.22 67.00 13.38 10.90
However, the participants’ distributive incomes to stratum C
in the social-planner and veil of ignorance contexts were both
higher than that in the context of known position (Mann–
Whitney test: z= 13.065, p< 0.01; z= 13.002, p< 0.01). We have
shown the mean and SD of distributive amounts across contexts
and chips in the sham group (Table 2).
In addition, there was no significant difference in Gini
coefficients for the distributions of income between the
social-planner and veil of ignorance contexts (Mann–Whitney
test: z = 1.225, p = 0.2204). However, the Gini coefficients
for the distribution of income in the social-planner and
veil of ignorance contexts were both lower than that in the
context of known position (Mann–Whitney test: z = −15.891,
p < 0.01; z = −16.202, p < 0.01). These results clearly
indicated that the participants’ distributive decisions depended
on the given context, and self-interest was an important
factor in the distributions the participants knew their
positions. The participants maximized their own payoff by
increasing distributive income to the stratum they belong
to and decreasing the distributive incomes to the other two
stratums.
We then performed a two-way ANOVA for distributive
proportions to stratum C with the stimulation type (right
anodal/left cathodal tDCS, left anodal/right cathodal tDCS,
sham stimulation) as a between-subject factor and the context
(social-planner, veil of ignorance, known position) as a within-
subject factor. There were significant main effects of stimulation
type (F(2,777) = 16.122, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.014) and context
(F(2,777) = 608.555, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.343). More importantly,
a significant interactive effect of stimulation type and context
was found (F(4,775) = 11.398, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.019). We further
compared participants’ distributive proportions to stratum C
among three stimulation types within different contexts. The
participants’ distributive proportions to stratum C within the
context of a known position after receiving right anodal/left
cathodal tDCS and receiving right cathodal/left anodal tDCS
over TPJ were both higher than after receiving the sham
stimulation (t-test and Bonferroni corrections: right anodal/left
TABLE 3 | The mean and SD of Gini coefficient across conditions and stimulation types.
Context R Anodal/L Cathodal R Cathodal/L Anodal Sham
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
The veil of ignorance 0.2655 0.05958 0.2794 0.06489 0.2744 0.06443
The social planner 0.2641 0.04986 0.2631 0.04916 0.2708 0.06610
The known position 0.4232 0.1673 0.4025 0.1405 0.5181 0.1566
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cathodal tDCS, p < 0.01; right cathodal/left anoodal tDCS,
p < 0.01). However, there was no significant difference between
the two active stimulation groups (t-test and Bonferroni
corrections: p = 0.997), and no significant difference among
three stimulation types within the contexts of social planner
and the veil of ignorance (t-test and Bonferroni corrections:
social planner, right anodal/left cathodal tDCS vs. sham,
p = 0.627, right cathodal/left anoodal tDCS vs. sham, p = 0.658;
the veil of ignorance, right anodal/left cathodal tDCS vs.
sham, p = 0.756, right cathodal/left anoodal tDCS vs. sham,
p = 0.944). This finding indicates that the enhanced activity
of the right TPJ (RTPJ) or the left TPJ (LTPJ) made the
participants more averse to advantage inequity and made
them more concerned about the distributive proportion to
the lowest income stratum within the context of the known
position.
In addition to the distributive proportion to the lowest
income stratum, we also used the Gini coefficient to examine
the participants’ equity-efficiency trade-offs in the income
distribution. Two-way ANOVA on the Gini coefficient of income
distribution was executed, with the context (social-planner, veil
of ignorance, known position) as a within-subject factor and
the stimulation type (right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, right
cathodal/left anodal tDCS, sham stimulation) as a between-
subject factor. We found a main effect of stimulation type
(F(2,777) = 3.525, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.009) and of context
(F(2,777) = 797.401, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.482). There was a significant
stimulation type × context interaction (F(4,775) = 30.160,
p< 0.01, η2p = 0.042).
To further evaluate the treatment effect, we also compared
the Gini coefficients of participants’ distribution among three
stimulation types within different contexts (Table 3).
The Gini coefficients within the context of known position
after receiving right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and receiving right
cathodal/left anoodal tDCS over the TPJ were both lower than
that after receiving the sham stimulation (t-test and Bonferroni
corrections: right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, p < 0.01; right
cathodal/left anoodal tDCS, p< 0.01) (Figure 4). However, there
was no significant difference between the two active stimulation
groups (t-test and Bonferroni corrections: p = 0.388), and no
significant difference among three stimulation types within the
contexts of social planner and the veil of ignorance (t-test and
Bonferroni corrections: social planner, right anodal/left cathodal
tDCS vs. sham, p = 0.323, right cathodal/left anoodal tDCS vs.
sham, p= 1; the veil of ignorance, right anodal/left cathodal tDCS
vs. sham, p = 0.515, right cathodal/left anoodal tDCS vs. sham,
p = 0.352) (Figure 4). These results are fully consistent with the
stimulation effect on the participants’ distributive proportions to
stratum C.
We introduced participants’ social preferences about
advantage inequity aversion to analyze the distributive decisions.
We found that the participants’ distributive proportions to
stratum C within the contexts of social planner and the veil
of ignorance were not related to their social preferences about
advantage inequity aversion (Spearman test: social planner,
p = 0.2156; the veil of ignorance, p = 0.6499). However, the
participants’ distributive proportions to stratum C within
FIGURE 4 | Mean Gini coefficients of participants’ distribution across
stimulation types over TPJ under the context of social-planner, veil of
ignorance, known position. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance of difference between treatments.
the context of known position was strongly related to their
social preferences, which were measured with the choice menu
(Spearman test: right anodal/left cathodal, p < 0.01; right
cathodal/left anodal, p < 0.01; sham, p < 0.01). The result
revealed that the participants who allocated more income to
stratum C tended to exhibit more advantage inequity aversion
in the choice menu and such an observation was robust in
all of the three tDCS groups (Figure 5A). There is a steeper
increasing trend of distributive proportions to stratum C with the
increase of advantage inequity aversion in the line of best fit for
right anodal/left cathodal and right cathodal/left anodal groups
comparing to those for sham group (see Figure 5 for scatter
plots and line of best fits). The quadratic curve of best fits may
indicate that the relationship between distributive proportions to
stratum C and advantage inequity aversion seems tighter among
participants with higher advantage inequity aversion in the right
anodal/left cathodal and right cathodal/left anodal groups than
the sham group (Figure 5B).
We also compared the participants’ social preference between
the active stimulation and sham stimulation conditions. The
advantage inequity aversion coefficient of the participants who
received right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and received right
cathodal/left anodal tDCS over the TPJ were higher than that
of the participants who received the sham stimulation (Mann–
Whitney test: right anodal/left cathodal tDCS, z = −2.442,
p = 0.0146; right cathodal/left anodal tDCS, z = −2.496,
p = 0.0126). These results indicated that tDCS to the
TPJ altered the social preference about advantage inequity
aversion of the participants (i.e., the participants were more
generous and more concerned about the lowest stratum after
receiving right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and receiving right
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FIGURE 5 | Scatter plots of participants in the context of known position. The horizontal axis represents the participants’ advantage inequity aversion and the
vertical axis represents the distributive proportions to stratum C. (A) The line of best fits for scatter plots of participants receiving different stimulations. (B) The
quadratic curve of best fits for scatter plots of participants receiving different stimulations.
cathodal/left anodal tDCS) and might led to relative changes
in their distributive decisions under the context of known
position.
DISCUSSION
Many previous studies from different fields have discussed the
issues of income distribution justice and the factors that influence
individuals’ distributive decisions (Friedman, 1953; Frohlich
and Oppenheimer, 1992; Rutström and Williams, 2000). These
studies focused on how people solved equity-efficiency trade-
offs in income distribution (Harsanyi, 1955; Rawls, 1971; Dahlby,
1987). Such redistribution choices might be governed by self-
concern (risk aversion) or social preference (inequality aversion)
(Vickrey, 1945; Cowell and Kuga, 1981; Andreoni and Miller,
2002). However, evidence is lacking in the field of neuroscience
regarding the link between distributive behavior and the regions
of the brain that are possibly related to preference.
The present research complements these studies with tDCS
by providing a causal relationship between distributive decisions
across various social contexts and the activities of the TPJ. In
addition to the brain stimulation results, we also investigated
the participants’ behavioral data that was required to make
distributive decisions in this distributive experiment to present
a comprehensive theory about the role of social preference in
distributive decisions in three different distributive contexts.
According to the behavioral data from the participants in
the sham group across the three contexts, we found a context
dependence of the distributive decisions, i.e., the participants
distributive income to the highest income stratum in the known
position context was significantly greater than those in the other
two contexts, and the participants’ distributive income to the
middle and lowest income stratum in the known position context
was significantly lower than those in the other two contexts.
Additionally, the Gini coefficients for the distribution incomes
in the social-planner and veil of ignorance contexts were both
lower than that of the context of known position. However,
there was no significant difference in the participants’ distributive
decisions (including the participants’ distributive income to the
three income stratums and the Gini coefficients) between the
contexts of social-planner and the veil of ignorance.
Consistent with prior distributive justice studies, these
results demonstrated that the individuals displayed remarkable
self-interest, and these decisions may be viewed as a posteriori
rationalizations when the positions were known (Beckman
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et al., 2002). In the social-planner and the veil of ignorance
contexts, the individuals tended to make more equal distributions
among the three social stratums. The participants in the social-
planner context decided on only the other participants’ payoffs
without being paid themselves (Krawczyk, 2010). Hence, our
experimental results revealed the existence of subjects’ self-
interest in the context of known position and the equal income
distribution in the contexts of social-planner and the veil of
ignorance. Our results also demonstrated that the participants
within the veil of ignorance preferred the distribution that
maximized the well-being of the least well-off (Traub et al., 2009;
Schildberg-Hörisch, 2010). However, the behavioral data were
still unable to confirm whether participants’ equal distribution
decisions in this context were the result of self-concern or
impartial social preferences.
Based on the above behavioral results, we provided further
neural evidence regarding distributive decisions in different
contexts. First, there was no significant difference in the
participants’ distributive proportions to the lowest income
stratum among the three stimulation types within the contexts
of social planner and the veil of ignorance. This finding
indicates that after receiving tDCS over TPJ, the participants
had not changed their equal distributive decisions within the
contexts of social planner and the veil of ignorance. Second,
we found that the participants allocated more income to the
lowest income stratum within the known position after receiving
right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and receiving right cathodal/left
anodal tDCS over the TPJ. This finding reveals that enhanced in
the activity of the right TPJ or left TPJ made the participants more
averse to advantage inequity and made them more concerned
about the distributive proportion to the lowest income stratum
within the context of known position.
Many studies have shown that the activities of the RTPJ and
the LTPJ are associated with the understanding of others’ mental
states (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2007; Aichhorn
et al., 2009; Ye et al., 2015b). Previous studies have demonstrated
the involvement of the TPJ during decision-making in social
preference by ultimatum game (Rilling et al., 2004; Declerck
et al., 2013) and that gray matter (GM) volume in the TPJ is
strongly associated with individuals’ altruism (Morishima et al.,
2012). Specifically, Young et al. (2010) used TMS to the RTPJ to
disrupt the capacity to understand others’ perspectives. Samson
et al. (2004) reported evidence from brain-damaged patients that
indicated that the patients with lesions in the LPTJ region exhibit
impairment in false mental states tasks.
Additionally, relatively few significant cathodal-inhibition
results have been revealed as compared to the anodal excitation
effects according to prior tDCS studies. Such an asymmetric
stimulation effect exists in cognitive or perceptual tasks. This
issue has been deeply discussed by Jacobson et al. (2012), who
argued that the lack of inhibitory cathodal effects might reflect
compensation processes as cognitive functions are typically
supported by rich brain networks. Hence, we inferred that
the participants who received right anodal/left cathodal tDCS
and right cathodal/left anodal tDCS over the TPJ exhibited an
improvement in the capacity to understand others’ perspectives
in altruistic behavior.
Together, the findings of these previous studies and our
findings about the distributive decisions of participants receiving
tDCS appear to indicate that the alterations of the social
preferences of the participants after the receipt of tDCS to the
TPJ might led to alterations in their distributive decisions within
the context of known position. Specifically, the participants
were likely to be more altruistic after receiving right anodal/left
cathodal tDCS and after receiving right cathodal/left anodal
tDCS over the TPJ, which made them more concerned about the
distributive proportion to the lowest income stratum within the
known position. However, the alterations of the social preferences
of the participants after the receipt of tDCS to the TPJ did not lead
to alterations in their distributive decisions within the contexts of
social planner and the veil of ignorance.
To demonstrate our deductions, we provided more evidence
about the stimulation effect on the Gini coefficient and advantage
inequity aversion. A significant interactive effect of context and
the stimulation type was found, and the Gini coefficients within
the context of known position after receiving right anodal/left
cathodal tDCS and receiving right cathodal/left anodal tDCS
over the TPJ were both lower than after receiving the sham
stimulation. However, there was no significant difference among
the three stimulation types within the contexts of social planner
and the veil of ignorance. These findings were fully consistent
with the stimulation effect on the participants’ distributive
proportions to the lowest income stratum across the different
contexts. This finding indicates that the subjects’ social preference
in the context of known position was changed after the receipt
of tDCS to the TPJ and the equal income distributions in the
contexts of social-planner and the veil of ignorance have not been
changed by tDCS to the TPJ. Therefore, we might rule out the role
of social preference in distributive decision within the contexts of
social planner and the veil of ignorance.
We directly elicited participants’ advantage inequity aversion
with a choice menu to further verify the role of social preference
in distributive decisions across the different contexts. Powerful
evidence indicated that the participants’ distributive proportions
to the lowest income stratum within the known position were
strongly related to the values of advantage inequity aversion.
However, the participants’ distributive proportions to the lowest
income stratum within the contexts of social planner and the veil
of ignorance were not related to the values of advantage inequity
aversion. These findings suggest that the participants’ income
distribution within the known position depended on the degree
of their advantage inequity aversion and the participants’ equal
distributions within the contexts of social planner and the veil of
ignorance were not derived from their altruistic social preference
(advantage inequity aversion).
More importantly, we observed a significant stimulation effect
on the advantage inequity aversion of the participants. The
participants who received right anodal/left cathodal tDCS and
who received right cathodal/left anodal tDCS over the TPJ were
more averse to advantage inequity than the participants who
received the sham stimulation. These findings are fully consistent
with the stimulation effect on the participants’ distributive
decisions within the known position. Therefore, the present study
demonstrated that the modulation of the excitability of the TPJ
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might alter participants’ distributive decisions within the known
position through the main driving force of these decisions, i.e.,
social preference about advantage inequity aversion.
However, it is obvious that participants’ distributive decisions
within the contexts of social planner and the veil of ignorance
have not been changed through the alteration of their advantage
inequity aversion. When judged from within a veil of ignorance,
income distributions are considered gambles (Friedman, 1953;
Dahlby, 1987). In the context of social-planner, the social welfare
function lacks any personal involvement (Brandt and Boulding,
1962; Cowell and Kuga, 1981; Lambert, 2001). Taken together, we
can infer that participants’ equal distributions in the contexts of
social planner and the veil of ignorance might be attributable to
the social norm or risk attitudes, but not to the advantage inequity
aversion.
In this study, we provided causal evidence regarding the
function of the TPJ in income distributive decisions across
various contexts and revealed that activation of this neural
region can alter the participants’ distributive decisions within the
known position, but no significant influence on the participants’
distributive decisions in the social planner and the veil of
ignorance contexts were found. Our observations also indicate
that participants’ social preference (advantage inequity aversion)
is closely correlated with their distributive decisions under the
known position; thus, the modulation of the activity of the
TPJ might change participants’ distributive decisions within the
known position by altering their social preferences, and the
participants’ equal income distributions in the contexts of social
planner and the veil of ignorance are not related to their social
preference of altruistic behavior.
One limitation of the current study is that although our
findings regarding the effect of stimulation over the TPJ on
social preference were consistent with previous findings, the
potential neural mechanism by which the specific brain area
influences distributive decisions by altering social preference
remains to be revealed and discussed. It cannot exclude that
other psychological processes might be altered which influenced
both the distributive decisions and social preferences while
modulating TPJ through tDCS. Further brain imaging studies
may focus on the dynamic activation of the TPJ while participants
make distributive decisions across various contexts. Another
option is to modulate the activities of other relative brain regions
(e.g., DLPFC) to explore whether participants’ distributive
decisions are changed, which would provide more information
about intrinsic preferences related to distributive decisions across
different contexts. Another deficiency of our study is that we
cannot determine if the impact on distributive decisions and
social preference are solely attributable to modulation of activity
in the right TPJ or if the behavioral effects are the result
of changing the balance of activity across both TPJs. Future
studies may include neuroimaging measures to explore the neural
changes associated with neuromodulation leading to behavioral
effects and also to explore other paradigms of stimulation,
such as unilateral stimulation. Moreover, the between-subject
design in the current study highly relied on the hypothesis
that the original levels of participants’ advantageous inequity
aversion were identical among the three stimulation groups.
The correlations between advantageous inequity aversion and
distributive justice under the three contexts are not completely
valid. These issues caused by heterogeneity should be considered
seriously in our future studies which may be improved by
more precise designs such as applying a within-subject design
or performing a pre-test inequity aversion level measurement.
No significant difference between the social-planner and veil
of ignorance contexts may due to misconception about the
experiment paradigm in some participants which should also be
improved in further experimental designs.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, our experiment demonstrated that modulating
the excitability of the TPJ using tDCS altered the distributive
decisions of the participants under the known position, and
this effect might be attributable to a change in the individuals’
social preferences. We also found that participants’ distributive
decisions under the contexts of social planner and the veil of
ignorance have not been changed through the alteration of their
advantage inequity aversion. It suggests that the participants’
equal income distributions in the contexts of social planner and
the veil of ignorance are not related with their social preference
of altruistic behavior.
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